The liberalisation of the elec tricity mark et in Co nt inenta l Euro pe started in th e late 1990 ' s and is still ongoing. In th is paper, past developments in this mar ket are ana lysed and co nditions necessary to enha nce co mpetition in thi s market in the long run are deri ved.
INTRO DUCTIO N
Th e liberalisation of the electric ity market in Co ntinenta l Europe started in the late 1990 ' s and is still ongoing . W ith the exception of Spain, whi ch init iated an e lectricity poo l in 199 7, thi s pro cess wa s triggered by the " Directive for a common elec tricity market" issued by the Euro pea n Commiss ion (EC) in 1996. T he maj or mot ivation for this d irect ive was the EC's beli ef th at liberalization, pri ce deregul ati on and pr ivati zation w ill dir ectly lead to competition in generation as we ll as supp ly, resul ting in lower prices thr ough ou t Europe.
The intention of the EC was and still is the crea tion of one common Euro pea n electric ity mark et. Curre ntly, th is area co nsists of at least seven dist inct sub-markets separated by partl y insu fficient transmi ssion capac ity and di fferences in access conditions to the grid (Fi g.T . Th e objective of this paper is to ana lyze the evolution of the Contine nta l Europea n electric ity markets and discuss future development s with res pec t to competition (See former treatm ent s in Glach ant & Fi non (2003) , Jamasb & Poll itt (2005 ) , as well as the spec ial issue of the Energy J OI/I'/Io / (2005». T he paper co vers most of what is currently ca lled " Continenta l Europe" (CE )I. It is organized as follow s: Sec tio n 2 prov ides some background information w ith major data on e lectricity sup ply and dem and in the CE markets. Section 3 describes EC and national governments' market liberal izat ion initiatives and
• In Fra nce , Italy, Portugal , th e form er Cze ch-S lova k Republic, Poland, Hun gary and Slo venia, a strong stat e-owned verti call y integrated monopoly dominated the ES I. Thi s ce ntralize d structure typi cally led to a sing le dominant player, such as Electricite de France;
• In Spa in an d Sw itze rland, vert ica l integ rat ion wa s strong but with a handful of co mpa nies;
• In Ge rmany there we re about ten generators integrated w ith tran smi ssion but onl y parti ally integrated with supply (retail).
• In Austria there wa s one large ge nera to r integrated with tran sm ission and about 14 reg iona l supp liers fu lly integrated w ith distribution.
• In the Ne the rlands there was an upward ve rtica l integration by the distribution co mpa nies contro lling the grid and the ge ne rators;
• In Belgium, mo st of th e power sec tor has been private for decades. Th e pri vate generator Elec trabe l is superv ised and contro lled by a mother co mpa ny Tractebel link ed to the gas mon op oly Distrigas;
• Belgium, Germany, Spai n, and Swi tze rla nd we re the only co untr ies in the mid-1990 ' s where pr ivate ow ners hip amo ng ge ne rators prevailed (tem pered in German y and Switze rland by th e local public own ership of di stribution and supply, and the form er " State enterprise" natur e of Endes a in Spa in). Thi s contrasted with the state-owne d enterpr ises in France, Italy, Portugal, and the remaining Ce ntra l and Eastern co untries.
DEV ELOP MENT OF DEMAND AND SU PPLY
Total demand wa s approx ima tely 2300 TWh in the CE area in 2004. Curre ntly, the largest elec tricity mark ets are in Germany, Fra nce , Italy, and Spa in. The high est per ca pita demand is in Lu xem burg, Belgium and Swit zerl and . Th e low est per capita dem and is in Poland , Hun gary, Portugal, and Slovakia. Dem and growth per ye ar is stro ngest in Spa in (+5.0 % ), Portugal (+4 .9%), an d Austria (+3 . 1%). In Poland and Germa ny dem and increased only by about 1%. In all CE, electricity co nsumption grew fro m 1% to 3% per yea r bet ween 1999 and 2004. Detail s are depicted in Fig . 2 .
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GENERATION CAPACITY AN D LOAD
Ca pac ity m argin is di fferent among co untr ies as ca n be see n from Fig. 13 . However not all gross ca pac ity is ava ilable for ge nera tion. Thi s is especi ally tru e for hydro cap acit y (A ustria, Spa in) and old fossi l plants (It aly) . E.g. Italy, Austria and The Neth erla nds wh ich are net importers of energy also exhibit such an apparent exc ess capacity margin.
Fig ure 3 depicts the evol ution of gross ge neration cap acit y over the last 10 yea rs in CE oTh e growth in capac ity is mainly from wind power and fossil po wer plant s. 
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
In 2004, the total amount of e lectricity exchanged between CE co untries stoo d at about 300 TWh. Thi s is equa l to about 13 % of consumption and is freque ntly limited by the con strained cross-border transmission ca pac ity . Figure 4 and Fig. 5 show the ph ysicaf electricity exchange between CE countries. France is the biggest net exporter amon g CE countries wit h net exports of a lmo st 67 TWh followed by Cze ch Republic and Poland. T he major importing countries are Ita ly with 51 TWh foll ow ed by The Ne the rlands and Hun gary with 17 TWh and 7 TWh respecti ve ly. (So urce: uctt: (2005) . Figure 6 presents the highest percentages of Net Transfer Capaci ty (NTC) used in 2004 between CE co untries. Due to the operating complexity of a European meshed network, commercial capacity and physical cap acity differ. Hence, the interconn ecti on capac ity is defin ed by ETS O as "NTC". T he most co ngested lines are between Italy' and its neigh bouring countries, Th e values substa ntia lly exc ee ding 100 % in Figure 6 require furt he r exp lanat io n: th e tran smi ssion capacit y is th e NTC defin ed by th e UCT E. How ever th e actu al therm al capaci ty (th e real ph ysica l ca pac ity ) of th e line is high er. Yet, it dep end s on the characteristics of the material and the ambient tem peratu re (i.e. seaso n ). For instance it is higher in wi nter and lower in sum mer. Thi s lead s to possible numbers high er tha n 100% as exhibited in Fig. 6. and between Spain and Portuga l. But next are already the borders between Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic.
In pri nc iple , the conges ted lines need a spec ial mechani sm to be man aged in an economic wa y (see Section 4). Th e ex isting CE net work was built to guarantee a good level of technical reli ability and to give some room for managing peak load problem s. N ow it is supposed to be used more in an ec onomic wa y, und er opt imisation processe s of scarce capacity, and to produce price convergenc e in a sin gle European mark et perspective.
POLITICAL ISSUE S OF RESTRUCTURI NG
Th e restructuring of the CE electricity market was ma inly triggered by the EU dire cti ve on ' Common Rules f or the Internal Market in Electricity' w hich ca me into force in Februa ry 1999 . Th e major obj ect ive was to create a co mmon Europea n elect ricit y market , EC (1997).The major issues dealt with by this Directi ve (o fficiall y named 96/92) were: How ever eac h national gove rn ment within the EU had to " transpose" the EU Directive into national law and national rules. An overview on the major mil estones of reforming the electricity sector in CE is provided in Table I .
In practice, the major area of action within th e European liberalization proj ect was "prov iding ac cess to the market" . Far less attention wa s paid to th e issues of restructuring ge neration & suppl y and designing marketplaces as well as ensur ing ade quate ge nera tion and transmission capacity. Ind ep end ent ene rgy regulators were introduced in all countr ies exce pt Germ any and Switzerla nd. En vironment al issues were also treat ed ve ry prominentl y .
However , as ide fro m minim al unbundling, the restructuring of utili ties and the design of market places was not tackl ed co mpre hensively by the governments in most co untries (few exceptio ns: Spain created a ce ntra lized pool , Italy divested ge neration ca pac ities). 
PRO VIDI NG NON -DISCRIM INA TO RY ACCESS TO THE MA RKET AN D TO TH E GRID
Th e first important requirem ent for a co mpe titive elec tric ity mark et is non-discriminat ory access to the g rid. Th erefore a prerequ isite for co mpetition is the unbund ling of gen eration and supply from tran smi ssion . This mean s tha t access to transmission an d distribut ion should be offered to all market part icip ant s at reason abl e and non -di scr im inatory pri ces.
So far the ex pe riences with res pec t to unbundling between ge neration and transm ission in CE are di verse. In Belgium , Spa in, Portugal an d Italy, unb undl ing of ge neration and tran smissio n by ow nership was ac hieved either by fu ll ind ependen ce of the tran smi ssion co mpany or by flotation of a tra ns mission subs id iary. In othe r countries, es pec ially in Germany and France, only legal unbundling took place . In Switzerla nd, so far unbundl ing was o nly do ne by mean s of inte rna l managem en t mea sures. No structura l gua rantee ex ist for avoidi ng d iscrimination in access to th e gr id, particular ly as no independe nt regul at or ca n monitor the behavior of th e grid man ager s. Ta ble 2 pro vid es the curre nt sta tus o f unbund lin g. Th e second issu e is the regi me of access to the gri d. Ta ble 2 shows access to the transmiss ion gri d in various Western European co untr ies (CEC (2005)). Access to the grid was reg ulated in a ll co untries except Germa ny w here it was introduced in June 2005 . ,ft
MARKET OPENING
. 1999 Th e third issue is market op en ing. Th e differ ent market op enin g s, in location and in time, have led to some distortions regarding free choice of supplier. Fig. 7 depi cts the op ening of the market in differ ent EU member co untries from 1999 to 2005. Some countries like German y, T he Ne ther lands, Spai n, Portugal and Austria have legall y fully op ened the ir mar ket whi le others like Fra nce, Lu xem bur g, and Cze ch Republ ic have only partially ope ned their mark ets. In Sw itzerla nd (which is not member o f the EU) there is cur rently no competition in supply.
THE NEW INSTIT UTIO NAL AN D REG ULATORY ENVIRO NME NT
In all co untries, ex ce pt Ge rma ny and Switze rla nd, ind epend ent regul atory authoriti es have been cr eat ed. Th eir po wer s vary wide ly from on e country to another but their common core tasks are:
• to en sure that unbundling is achi eved ; • to regul ate ac cess to th e grid; and • to regul at e tari ffs for the use of the tran sm ission & distribut ion grid. In pr act ice, the cur rent Euro pean regul atory governa nce consists of a decentralized fram ework at the nati on al level and an incomplet e pro cess of conve rge nce across countries. Countries-l established nationally-ba sed regulatory authorities admi niste red by nati onals. Th ey regulate acc ess to the national TS O's gri d and ope rating sys tem. A ll thi s is don e w ithin the laws o f the country and with reco urse to its cou rts, w hile the Euro pea n Directives an d Regul at ion s provid e only a bro ad commo n frame. However the Euro pean Commission or the Europea n Cour t of Justi ce ca n in ter vene on a case by case basi s.
THE PROMOTION OF RENEW ABLES
Cur rently, the prom otion of elec tr icity from ren ewabl e energy sources (RES-E ) plays an important role in the energy policy of the EU. Th e majo r poli cy reasons are: (i) reducing th e depend ence on energy imports; (ii) reducing greenhouse gas emissions . To meet this target the E U has defin ed ambitious obj ecti ves whi ch we re form ali zed in the "Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the promotio n of electricity Fall/ renewable energ y sou rces in the internal electricity market (RES-E Di recti ve)" (EC 20 00) . As a result of th is directi ve, RES-E ge nera tion should reach a total share of 22% o f electric pr odu ction in 20 I0 from a level of 12%) in 1998 (EC, 2000).
-I Except Germany and Swi tzerland .
COMPARI SO N OF DEVELOPMENT S BY CO UNTRY
Th e development s toward s co mpe tition in the countries and sub-ma rke ts so far were quite different as can be see n from Tabl e 3, Major differences between the countries refer to: Mergers and takeover s: main ly in Germany and cro ss-border tak eo vers and sha re purchases (of EdF, E-ON, ENEL, ELEC T RA BE L, RW E).
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MARKETS
Today, the EC has success fu lly initiated an ambitious project for building a new e lectricity market. But there are no guarantees that the dynamics of this con struction w ill not dis sipate, as in the United States, or that the inte rna l market wi ll not remai n fractured in " nationa l or loca l blocks" which may persist for a lon g tim e (G lac hant & Leveque 2005; Glachant & Finon 2005) . Moreo ver, as has been argued by (Haas et al (199 7) and Haa s/Au er (200 I» ,the expec tation of lasting competition in a " free" market is based on ve ry simplified ass umptio ns on the strateg ic beha vio r of electric ity ge ne rators and network operators. Sim ilarly we not e the caveats expressed by Banks (1996) C'the market is a wandel/it! thing and it should be exp loited as far as possible but it also has its limits") and Ne wbery (2002 ) that are based on the exp erienc es in the UK and the No rdic market (Norway, Sweden . .. ).
Cur rently, the major obstacle for Europ ean common market(s) is a general lack of competition in vir tua lly all local and national who lesa le as we ll as retail electricity mark ets because the number of competitors is too low , or because barriers to entry and incenti ves to co llude remain too high. Th ese aspects are reinforced by (at lea st) two oth ers: 1 0 insufficient tran smi ssion capacit y avail able bet we en th e submarkets, and 2 0 increasin g ho rizontal integration with natural gas supply.
Hen ce, the paramount objective is still to co nstruct compe titive markets while -at the same time -ensuring a rea son able level of grid reliability and supply adequacy.
ACCESS TO THE MARKET
Th ere are thr ee major prioriti es for improvin g access to th e CE gr id: harmonize national tran sm ission access pricin g schemes and cross bo rde r pric ing . Th is wo uld contribute to lower tran sacti on costs in internat ional co mpet ition.
MERGERS, TAKEOVER S AN D MA RKET CONCENTRATIO N
For effective co mpetition, a large number of companies are needed. No othe r mod el has so far been successful. This wa s pro ven clearl y by th e exa mple of Eng land & Wa les where the numb er of ge nerators was increased several times by the regulatory aut hority (as we ll as by investors, notab ly the regional di stribution & supply co mpa nies , the RECs). The "me rger-ma nia" in CE after the start of liberalizati on indic ates that the maj or strategy of th e bigge r incumbent ut ilities is to compe te by mergin g to pur chase mar ket share s.
In many Eastern Euro pea n countries, nation al co mpa nies have been so ld to strateg ic investors from abroa d, with EdF, E.On, RW E, Electrabel and Vattenfall all bein g particul arly active. In reac tion, some countries , like Czech Republic, Slovakia & Slovenia have chosen to retain nationa l champions. Th ese nati on al cha mpio ns have the size to stay alive alon gsid e th e lar ger Euro pean gro ups w ith unfortunate con sequ enc es for the level of co mpe tition wit hin their res pec tive nation al markets and for the globa l European co mpetitive ga me. T he vested interests of the dom inant incumbents in the reg ion wo uld enco urage them to fight against greater co mpe tition pu shed by furth er refo rms .
With res pect to market shares in CE , in 1998 ten generators owned 60 % of the ge neratio n capac ity wh ile in 2002 th is share wa s co nce ntra ted in six generators (see Codognet et al (2005) ). Tho mas (2003) suspec ts that in th e end only "seven broth er s" will rem ain as large ge nerato rs w ithin Euro pe. Of particular co ncern wi th respect to co mp etitio n is the situa tio n in Centra l Europe (France , Germa ny, BeNelux , Austria) . T he concentration process in the electric ity ge neration market was espec ially fulminou s in Germany. Mez (2003) pro vides an impress ing and detailed descr ipti on of thi s process. A different but converging picture is described in Finon (2003) . He portrays how a domi nan t player like EdF in France can be nefit from liberal izat ion by exerting mar ket power in the hom e mar ket w hile at the sa me time an agg ressive acquisition poli cy is pursued a broa d. Verbruggen et al ( 999) show the sa me for the Elec trabe l -Di strigas group in Belgi um.
As ca n be see n from Fig. 8 Table 4 depicts the curre nt mar ket struct ure in CE countries. In most co untries, market structure is highly probl em at ic pa rticularl y whe n the nat ion al grid is poo rly co nnec ted w ith adj ace nt markets an d the import potential is limi ted. Of course , an easy so lution w ith res pec t to th e number of ge nerato rs in eac h relevant market wo uld be to have more generators and so me divestm en t. Yet, with some min or exceptions (Spai n, Italy) current ly the re are no signs in any country pointing in this direction.
Anot her issue is that privatization is often see n as more important than ca refully designin g the co mpe tition mechani sm s. However, as Newbery ( 1998) asserted for Eng land, "co mpe tition rather than p rivatization is the so urce 0/ the benefits". And und er compe titive pressur e, public utilit ies performed reasona bly in the Nordic count ries.
Of particular relevance in th is co ntext is the ownership future of EdF. For years the privatization of EdF has bee n under discussion and a public sha re offering was held in the Fa ll of 2005. However , given the limited number of ge ne rators engaged in this market it is unli kely that a part ial pr ivatization of EdF would add much to the Fr en ch " fringe competition" (G lacha nt & F ino n 2005) .
WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICE EVOLUTION
Of greater interes t is how e lectricity prices developed afte r restructuring. Fro m Fig . 9 we derived the foll owing effec ts:
In Weste rn Europe prices increased re lative to the start of liberalizat ion; (ii) the price level is highest in areas where capacity margin is sma ller and cross-bo rder transmiss ion capacity co ngested (Italy, T he Ne the rla nds) ; (iii) pri ces have been high est in yea rs w ith low hydro or low nuclear ava ilability ; (iv) however wholesale prices go up and are converging to the top in markets connected by sufficient transmission capacity.
-~~~~~~-~~~~.--~~~~~0 0 00~~~~00 M~~~~~00 00~~~~00 M M~0 T herefore a maj or question for furt her investigations is, w hether these pric es are a compe titive out come. Th at is to say, wh eth er these prices do refl ect the margi nal costs of the ge nerat ion set or w he the r they are increased by some kind of ma rket powe r.
RET AIL ELECT R ICITY PRI CE EVOLU T ION
T he major ex pectation of final cu stom ers w ith respect to the liberal ization of e lec tr icit y mar ket s wa s that prices wou ld drop substantially. (Source: CEC (2004) . CEC (2005) . based 0 11 EUIWS7il T Dc. average electricity consumption: 3500 kWh) ,"') '")No tc that the situation for Italy is specifi c. Averagc con sump tion is lower than 3500 k Whlyr and e lectrici ty prices for lo wer co nsu mption are sig nificantly lo wer (abo ut 40' X,).
INDUSTRY ELECTRICITY PRICES (EXCL. TAXES)
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-- 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 F igu re 11. Evo lut ion of large industrial custo mers' elec trici ty prices in some CE countries exc l. taxes Source: CEC (2004 Fig. 12 shows the typi ca l patt ern o f pric e deve lopm ent a fter liberali zation. After liberali za tion is annou nced price s drop . But soon after the mark et has settled suppliers sta rt to increa se pri ces aga in. 
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PER SP ECTIVES FO R A DEQUACY , RELI ABILITY A ND SECUR ITY OF SU PPLY : G EN ERATION AN D TRANSMI SSION CAP ACITY
As in man y electricity market s that have bee n libe ra lized , most CE countries start ed liberalizati on with significa nt exc ess genera tion capac ity -bui ld up in the time of regul ated area mon op oli es. Thi s wa s a co mmo n moti vation and dri ver for introducing co mpetitio n. Yet , excess capac ity in ge neratio n plays a core role in the restruct ur ing proc es s o f an ESI. With exc ess cap ac ity in gene ration -w hic h also depen d s on tra nsmi ssio n capacity -if utilities co mpete the price they rec ei ve for elec tricity will be equal to their short term margin al co st. U nde r per fect compe tition without rem arkabl e exc ess capac ities , the price w ill be equa l to the long-run margin al co sts (L RMC). But if there is no compe tit io n, or capacity is too tight , the price ca n be subs ta ntially high er than both margin a l co sts especia lly wh en dem and is inelastic to pr ice. Fig . 13 depicts the currently loom ing de ve lopments of load and ge ne ratio n ca pac ity'. In recen t years spare ca pacity de creased co nti nuous ly in CE submarkets (sp are capaci ty = net capac ity minus maximum load ). T his picture is not the same in various co untries. In Italy, load has a lrea dy surpassed availab le net capacity. ... Eas tern Europe (CZ, HU, PL , SK, SL) has adequ ate generation capacity for the foreseeabl e future, and will continue to be heavil y weight ed tow ard s coa l and nuclear power (see A ue r et a l 2005 ). On e remaining majo r unc ertainty in Eas tern co untries is the magnitude of demand growth.
Cur rently, tra nsm issio n constraints have a substantial impact on the separation of sub-markets in Co ntinenta l Europe. I-Ience, anot he r importan t prerequisite for a suffic iently wide market wo uld be that there is sufficient tra ns nuss ion cap acity to nei ghbor region s, increa sing the num ber of po tentially co mpeti ng ge nerators.
CONCL USIO NS
Whi le th e lib eral ized CE e lectricity mar ket is still und er construct ion, major concl us ions regarding the development s so far ca n alrea dy be drawn . Firstly, Liberalisat ion in CE started abo ut a decade a fter the for erunners in the UK and Norway. However, it see ms that the CE countries did not learn mu ch fro m the UK and No rwegian ex pe riences regard ing co nd itions for co mpeti tio n. Instead of divest ing ge neration ca pacity and increasing the number of co mpetitors (as rec ommended by Ne wbery & Poll itt (1 997) most co untries pursu ed merger s (DE , NL), reta ined ol igopo lies (NL, ES, AT , CH), private monopoly (B E), or supported the concept of national cha mpions (PO, FR). Only Italy has chose n a quite d ifferent strateg y of divestment of the forme r national cha mpion ENEL. Second, the CE electr icity mark et is the largest reg io na l market in Euro pe and its geograp hical positi on implies that further prog ress toward an integ rate d e lectricity market in Europe will depend stro ng ly on th e develo pm ent of this mark et (Jamasb &P ollitt (20 05)). Fra nce and Ge rma ny p lay a key rol e within thi s mark et becau se of th eir size and central geog raphic position. Third ly, currently the major ob stac le for a co mmo n mar ket that works rea sonabl y is a ge ne ra l lack of compe tition in virtua lly all local and nation al who lesa le as we ll as reta il e lectr ic ity markets because the number of co mpetitors is too low, or because barriers to ent ry are too high or ince nt ives to co llude are too high . This aspect is rein forced by (at leas t) two oth er s: an insufficient transmission capaci ty avai lable between the submarkets and an increasing horizontal integration with natural gas supply. Fourthly, the EC itself is in an ambiguous po sition. On the one hand, it still adv oca tes the goa l of a Eur opea n-w ide co mmon electricity mark et to be reach ed by 20 12. On the other hand , only very weak light-handed measures are being imp lemente d at the European sca le. One of the maj or problems sti ll is and will be that the market power of the large -and still growingincumbent ge nerators ca nnot be tackl ed by the EC. Th e second one is the behavior of T SOs that are not unbundled from ge neration or from the interests of the ir nat ion al block of sta keho lders. Th e EC acts wea kly becau se stronge r action wo uld require dramatic changes to Me mber States ' institutio ns and policy. As Newber y (2002) arg ued "the E U lacks the necessa ry legislative and regulatory power to mitigate generator market power. Unless markets are made more contestable, transmiss ion capacity expanded and adequate ge neration cap aci ty ensured, liberalization may lead to higher p rices". Only the Eur opea n Co mpetition A uthority and the Eur opean Co urt of Ju stice have so me power to pu sh nation al governme nts an d nati on al enti ties furth er.
Exactly how this might be done remains an open question. In addition. a very ambiguous role is currently being played by privatization . On the one hand, there is currently a strong majority in Europe which sees privatization as the politically correct solution regarding ownership. On the other hand, privatization frequent ly simply means a maximization of the market value of the shares sold to one of the large incumbent players (the "seven brothers" dep icted by (Thomas (2003 ) ). This problem partially applies to EdF, the most important looming privatization case. Of course, the French government is not looking towards reducing the potential value of its EDF shares (50 to 60 billions of euros ). Therefore, it has no economic incentive to strengthen competition at home and it should prefer strengthening the position of its champion in France as well as in the EU markets.
Finally, it is stated that current ly in most regions there is still sufficient spare capacity in generation and transmission available. The definiti ve litmus test for liberalization will come in every sub-market in CE at the po int-of-time when the bulk of excess capacity has disappeared and demand comes close to available capacity. That is to say, the most important prob lem is to provide long term incentives for investments in the upgrade and in new generation and transmission capacities, as well as in demand-side efficiency and demand responsiveness measures. This issue is especially relevant in the context of further development of the electricity supply system and the decentralized l'S centralized choices.
